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Abstract
We investigate query-to-communication lifting theorems for models related to the quantum adversary
bounds. Our results are as follows:
1. We show that the classical adversary bound lifts to a lower bound on randomized communication
complexity with a constant-sized gadget. We also show that the classical adversary bound is
a strictly stronger lower bound technique than the previously-lifted measure known as critical
block sensitivity, making our lifting theorem one of the strongest lifting theorems for randomized
communication complexity using a constant-sized gadget.
2. Turning to quantum models, we show a connection between lifting theorems for quantum
adversary bounds and secure 2-party quantum computation in a certain “honest-but-curious”
model. Under the assumption that such secure 2-party computation is impossible, we show that
a simplified version of the positive-weight adversary bound lifts to a quantum communication
lower bound using a constant-sized gadget. We also give an unconditional lifting theorem which
lower bounds bounded-round quantum communication protocols.
3. Finally, we give some new results in query complexity. We show that the classical adversary
and the positive-weight quantum adversary are quadratically related. We also show that the
positive-weight quantum adversary is never larger than the square of the approximate degree.
Both relations hold even for partial functions.
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1 Introduction
Communication complexity is an important model of computation with deep connections
to many parts of theoretical computer science [29]. In communication complexity, two
parties, called Alice and Bob, receive inputs x and y from sets X and Y respectively, and
wish to compute some joint function F : X × Y → {0, 1} on their inputs. Alice and Bob
cooperate together, and their goal is to minimize the number of bits they must exchange
before determining F (x, y).
Recently, a lot of attention has been devoted to connections between communication
complexity and query complexity. In particular, query-to-communication “lifting” theorems
are powerful tools which convert lower bounds in query complexity into lower bounds in
communication complexity in a black-box manner. Since query lower bounds are typically
much easier to prove than communication lower bounds, these tools are highly useful for
the study of communication complexity, and often come together with new communication
complexity results (such as separations between different communication complexity models).
For example, see [21, 22, 23, 25, 16].
Lifting theorems are known for many models of computation, including deterministic
[23] and randomized [25] algorithms. Notably, however, a lifting theorem for quantum query
complexity is not known; the closest thing available is a lifting theorem for approximate
degree (also known as the polynomial method), which lifts to approximate logrank [37]. This
allows quantum query lower bounds proved via the polynomial method to be turned into
quantum communication lower bounds, but a similar statement is not known even for the
positive-weight quantum adversary method [5, 39].
In this work, we investigate lifting theorems for the adversary method and related
models. We prove a lifting theorem for a measure called the classical adversary bound. For
the quantum adversary method, we show that there is a surprising connection with the
cryptographic notion of secure 2-party computation. Specifically, we show that a lifting
theorem for a simplified version of the positive-weight adversary method follows from a
plausible conjecture regarding the impossibility of secure 2-party computation in a certain
“honest but curious” quantum model. We also prove an unconditional lifting theorem which
lower bounds bounded-round quantum algorithms.
Finally, we prove some query complexity results that may be of independent interest:
first, a quadratic relationship between the positive-weight adversary bound and the classical
adversary bound; and second, we show that the positive-weight adversary bound can never be
larger than the square of the approximate degree. This means that the (positive) adversary
method can never beat the polynomial method by more than a quadratic factor. These
results hold even for partial functions.
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1.1 Lifting theorems
The statement of a lifting theorem typically has the following form:
Mcc(f ◦ G) = Ω(M(f)).
Here G : X × Y → {0, 1} is a (fixed) communication complexity function, called a “gadget”,
which typically has low communication cost; f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is an arbitrary Boolean
function; M(·) is a measure in query complexity, representing the cost of computing the
function f in query complexity; and Mcc(·) is a measure in communication complexity.
The notation f ◦ G denotes the block-composition of f with G. This is a communication
complexity function defined as follows: Alice gets input (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ X n, Bob gets input
(y1, y2, . . . , yn) ∈ Yn, and they must output f(G(x1, y1), G(x2, y2), . . . , G(xn, yn)). Hence
f ◦ G is a function with signature X n × Yn → {0, 1}.
There are two primary types of lifting theorems: those that work with a constant-sized
gadget G (independent of f), and those that work with a gadget G whose size logarithmic
in the input size n of f . 2 The latter type tend to be much more prevalent; recent lifting
theorems for deterministic and randomized communication complexities all use log-sized or
larger gadgets [23, 42, 17, 25, 16]. We remark, however, that even with log-sized or larger
gadgets, lifting theorems are highly nontrivial to prove: a lifting theorem for BPP, which
lifts randomized query lower bounds to randomized communication lower bounds, was only
established in the last few years, while an analogous result for BQP remains an open problem.
Lifting theorems which work with a constant-sized gadget are even harder to prove, but
often turn out to be much more useful. The reason is that common function families, like
disjointness (which we denote Disjn) 3 or inner product (which we denote IPn) 4, are universal.
This means for every communication function G : X × Y → {0, 1}, its communication matrix
(that is, its truth table) is a submatrix of the communication matrix of a sufficiently large
instance of the Disj function. In other words, every communication function is a sub-function
of Disjk and IPk for sufficiently large k. If the size of G is constant, then it is necessarily
contained in a Disj function of constant size (and similarly for IP). Hence lifting with
any constant-sized gadget G is enough to guarantee a lifting theorem with a constant-sized
disjointness gadget and constant-sized inner product gadget (and similarly for every other
universal function family). In short, lifting with a constant-sized gadget implies lifting with
almost any gadget of your choice.
In particular, a lifting theorem with a constant-sized gadget immediately implies a lower
bound for Disjn and IPn themselves. To see this, suppose we had a lifting theorem
Mcc(f ◦ G) = Ω(M(f))
for all Boolean functions f and a fixed (constant-sized) communication gadget G. Then G is a
sub-function of Disjk and of IPk for some constant k. Note that Disjn = ORn/k ◦Disjk and
that IPn = Parityn/k ◦ IPk. Hence we get Mcc(Disjn) = Ω(M(ORn/k)) and Mcc(IPn) =
Ω(M(Parityn/k)). Since k is constant, this can potentially give lower bounds on Mcc(Disjn)
and on Mcc(IPn) that are tight up to constant factors, depending on the measures Mcc(·)
and M(·).
2 Sometimes, lifting theorems use a gadget G which is large – polynomial in n – but which can still be
computed using O(log n) communication.
3 In the disjointness function, Alice and Bob receive n-bit strings x and y and must output 1 if and only
if there exists an index i ∈ [n] such that xi = yi = 1.
4 In the inner product function, Alice and Bob receive n-bit strings x and y, and must compute inner
product of those strings over F2.
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There have only been a handful of lifting theorems which work with constant-sized
gadgets. One such result follows from Sherstov’s work for approximate degree and related
measures [37]. The part of that work which is most relevant to us is the lifting of approximate
degree to lower bounds on approximate logrank, and hence on the quantum communication
complexity of the lifted function. Sherstov’s work means that if one can prove a quantum
lower bound for a query function f using the polynomial method [9], then this lower bound
will also apply to the quantum communication complexity of f ◦ G, where G is a constant
sized gadget. Such a lifting theorem is not known to hold for the adversary methods [5, 39],
however (not even with a log-sized gadget).
Another lifting theorem with a constant-sized gadget appears in [27, 24]. There, a
query measure called critical block sensitivity [27] is lifted to a lower bound on randomized
communication complexity.
1.2 Adversary methods
The quantum adversary bounds are extremely useful methods for lower bounding quantum
query complexity. The original adversary method was introduced by Ambainis [5]. It was
later generalized in several ways, which were shown to all be equivalent [39], and are known
as the positive-weight adversary bound, denoted Adv(f). This bound has many convenient
properties: it has many equivalent formulations (among them a semidefinite program), it
is reasonably easy to use in practice, and it behaves nicely under many operations, such
as composition. The positive-weight adversary bound is one of the most commonly used
techniques for lower bounding quantum query complexity.
A related measure is called the negative-weight adversary bound, introduced in [26],
which we denote by Adv±(f). This is a strengthening of the positive adversary bound, and
satisfies Adv±(f) ≥ Adv(f) for all (possibly partial) Boolean functions f . Surprisingly, in
[35, 32], it was shown that the negative-weight adversary is actually equal to quantum query
complexity up to constant factors.
The quantum adversary methods have no known communication complexity analogues.
However, that by itself does not rule out a lifting theorem: one might still hope to lift
Adv(f) or Adv±(f) to lower bounds on quantum communication complexity, similar to how
critical block sensitivity cbs(f) was lifted to a lower bound on randomized communication
complexity [27, 24]. Unfortunately, no such lifting theorems are currently known, not even
for the positive-weight adversary method, and not even with a large gadget size.
Interestingly, it is possible to define a lower bound technique for randomized algorithms
which is motivated by the (positive) quantum adversary method. This measure was first
introduced in [1, 30], and different variants of it have been subsequently studied [6]. Here,
we use the largest of these variants, which we denote by CAdv(f) (in [6], it was denoted by
CMM(f)). In [6], it was shown that for total functions f , CAdv(f) is (up to constant factors)
equal to a measure called fractional block sensitivity, which we denote fbs(f). However, for
partial functions, there can be a large separation between the two measures. For more on
fractional block sensitivity, see [2, 28].
1.3 Our contributions
Lifting the classical adversary
Our first contribution is a lifting theorem for the classical adversary bound CAdv(f). We lift
it to a lower bound on randomized communication complexity using a constant-sized gadget.
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▶ Theorem 1. There is an explicitly given function G : X × Y → {0, 1} such that for any
(possibly partial) Boolean function or relation f ,
RCC(f ◦ G) = Ω(CAdv(f)).
Here RCC(f ◦ G) denotes the randomized communication complexity of f ◦ G with shared
randomness. We note that [27, 24] provided a lifting theorem that has a similar form, only
with the measure cbs(f) in place of CAdv(f). To compare the two theorems, we should
compare the two query measures. We have the following theorem.
▶ Lemma 2. For all (possibly partial) Boolean functions or relations f , CAdv(f) = Ω(cbs(f)).
Moreover, there is a family of total functions f for which CAdv(f) = Ω(cbs(f)3/2).
Lemma 2 says that CAdv(f) is a strictly stronger lower bound technique than cbs(f),
and hence Theorem 1 is stronger than the lifting theorem of [24]. A proof of Lemma 2 follows
from our proof that CAdv(f) ≥ cfbs(f)/2 in Lemma 26, together with the known power 3/2
separation between fbs(f) and bs(f) for total functions [20].5 This makes Theorem 1 one of
the strongest known lifting theorems for randomized communication complexity which works
with a constant-sized gadget.6
We note that the lifting theorem of [24] for the measure cbs(f) also works when f is
a relation, which is a more general setting than partial functions; indeed, most of their
applications for the lifting theorem were for relations f rather than functions. We extend
Theorem 1 to relations as well, and also show that CAdv(f) = Ω(cbs(f)) for all relations. In
fact, it turns out that for partial functions, CAdv(f) is equal to a fractional version of cbs(f),
which we denote cfbs(f); however, for relations, CAdv(f) is a stronger lower bound technique
than cfbs(f) (which in turn is stronger than cbs(f)). We also note that our techniques for
lifting CAdv(f) are substantially different from those of [27, 24].
Lifting quantum measures
Our first quantum result says that CAdv(f) lifts to a lower bound on bounded-round quantum
communication protocols. This may seem surprising, as CAdv(f) does not lower bound
quantum algorithms in query complexity; however, one can show that CAdv(f) does lower
bound non-adaptive quantum query complexity, or even quantum query algorithms with
limited adaptivity. This motivates the following result.
▶ Theorem 3. There is an explicitly given function G : X × Y → {0, 1} such that for any
(possibly partial) Boolean function or relation f ,
QCCr(f ◦ G) = Ω(CAdv(f)/r2).
Here QCCr(·) denotes the quantum communication complexity for an r-round quantum
protocol with shared entanglement.
We note that since any r-round protocol has communication cost at least r, we actually
get a lower bound of CAdv(f)/r2 + r. Minimizing over r yields a lower bound of CAdv(f)1/3
even on unbounded-round protocols. This may not seem very useful, since CAdv(f)1/3 is
5 For total functions, we have fbs(f) = cfbs(f) and cbs(f) = bs(f).
6 Sherstov’s lifting theorem for approximate degree [37] also works with a constant-sized gadget, and is
incomparable to our result as a lower bound technique for randomized communication complexity.
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smaller than d̃eg(f), a measure we know how to lift [37]. However, we can generalize this
result to relations. For relations, we do not know how to compare CAdv(f)1/3 to d̃eg(f),
and therefore our lifting theorem gives something new, even in the unbounded-round setting.
▶ Corollary 4. There is an explicitly given function G : X × Y → {0, 1} such that for any
(possibly partial) Boolean function or relation f ,
QCC(f ◦ G) = Ω(CAdv(f)1/3),
where QCC denotes the quantum communication complexity with shared entanglement.
We next turn our attention to lower bounding unbounded-round quantum communication
protocols by lifting a quantum adversary method. Instead of aiming for the positive-weight
adversary bound, we work with a simplified version, studied in [3], which we denote Adv1(f).
This measure is a restriction of Adv to a pairs of inputs with a single bit of difference.
We have Adv1(f) ≤ Adv(f), and [3] showed that Adv1(f) = O(d̃eg(f)). However, their
proof of the latter is tricky, and we do not use it here; we give a direct lifting of Adv1(f)
(under a certain assumption), and we argue that the techniques we use are likely to generalize
to lifting Adv(f) in the future.
We prove the following theorem, which lifts Adv1(f) but has a dependence on a new
complexity measure QICZ(G) that we introduce.
▶ Theorem 5. For any (possibly partial) Boolean function or relation f and any communic-
ation function G which contains both AND2 and OR2 as subfunctions, we have
QCC(f ◦ G) = Ω(Adv1(f) QICZ(G)).
At first glance, this theorem might look very strong: not only does it lift the simplified
adversary bound for a single gadget G, it even does so for all G and gives an explicit
dependence on G. Unfortunately, there is a catch: the measure QICZ(G) may be 0 for some
communication functions G. In fact, we cannot rule out the possibility that QICZ(G) = 0
for all communication functions G, in which case Theorem 5 does not say anything. On the
other hand, note that if QICZ(G) > 0 for even a single function G, then Theorem 5 gives a
lifting theorem for Adv1(f) with a constant-sized gadget, which works even for relations.
We give an interpretation of the measure QICZ(G) in terms of a cryptographic primitive
called secure 2-party computation. In such a primitive, Alice and Bob want to compute
a function G on their inputs x and y, but they do not want to reveal their inputs to the
other party. Indeed, Alice wants to hide everything about x from Bob and Bob wants to
hide everything about y from Alice, with the exception of the final function value G(x, y)
(which they are both expected to know at the end of the protocol). We also seek information-
theoretic security: there are no limits on the computational power of Alice and Bob. Since
we are interested in a quantum version, we will allow Alice and Bob to exchange quantum
communication rather than classical communication, potentially with shared entanglement.
Secure 2-party computation is known to be impossible in general, even quantumly
[33, 18, 14, 19, 36]. However, in our case, we care about an “honest but curious” version of
the primitive, in which Alice and Bob trust each other to execute the protocol faithfully,
but they still do not trust each other not to try to learn the others’ input. In the quantum
setting, it is a bit difficult to define such an honest-but-curious model: after all, if Alice and
Bob are honest, they might be forbidden by the protocol from ever executing intermediate
measurements, and the protocol might even tell them to “uncompute” everything except
for the final answer, to ensure all other information gets deleted. Hence it would seem that
honest parties can trivially do secure 2-party computation.
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The way we will define quantum secure two-party computation in the honest-but-curious
setting will be analogous to the information-based classical definition (see, for example, [13]).
Classically, the information leak that Alice and Bob must suffer in an honest execution of
the best possible protocol is captured by IC(G), the information cost of the function G. The
measure IC(G) is the amount Alice learns about Bob’s input plus the amount Bob learns
about Alice’s input, given the best possible protocol and the worst possible distribution over
the inputs; we note that this measure includes the value of G(x, y) as part of what Alice
and Bob learn about each others’ inputs, whereas secure two-party computation does not
count learning G(x, y) as part of the cost, but this is only a difference of at most 2 bits of
information (one on Alice’s side and one on Bob’s side); hence, up to an additive factor of 2,
IC(G) captures the information leak necessary in a two-party protocol computing G.
For a quantum version of this, we will use QIC, a measure which is a quantum analogue
of IC and which was introduced in [41]. However, we note that if Alice and Bob send the
same bit G(x, y) back and forth n times, this will add Θ(n) to the value of QIC for that
protocol, due to subtleties in the definition of QIC (this does not occur classically with IC).
Hence, in the quantum setting, QIC does not capture the two-party information leak as
cleanly as IC did classically.
Instead, we modify the definition of QIC to a measure we denote QICZ(G). For this
measure, Alice and Bob want a protocol Π such that for any distribution µ that has
support only on 0-inputs or only on 1-inputs, QIC(Π, µ) is small. In other words, if we
use QIC 0(Π) to denote the quantum information cost of Π against 0-distributions and
QIC 1(Π) to denote the quantum information cost of Π against 1-distributions, then we
define QICZ(Π) = max{QIC 0(Π), QIC 1(Π)}.
When QICZ(Π) is near zero, it means that Alice and Bob learn nothing about each
others’ inputs when conditioned on the output of the function. The two-party secure
computation question then becomes: does such a secure protocol Π exists for computing any
fixed communication function G?
Intuitively, we believe that the answer should be no, at least for some communication
functions G. This would align with the known impossibility of various types of secure 2-party
quantum computation, though none of those impossibility results seem to apply to our setting.
Interestingly, we have the following lemma, which follows directly form the way we define
QICZ(G).
▶ Lemma 6. Suppose that our version of secure 2-party quantum computation is impossible
for a communication function G which contains both AND and OR as sub-functions. Then
QICZ(G) > 0, and hence Adv1(·) lifts to a quantum communication lower bound with the
gadget G.
We hope that future work can extend this lemma to a lifting theorem for the positive-
weight quantum adversary Adv(·); if so, the problem of lifting the positive quantum adversary
bound will reduce to the problem of ruling out secure 2-party quantum computation in the
model we outlined above.
New query relations
Finally, our study of the classical adversary bound led to some new relations in query
complexity that are likely to be of independent interest.
▶ Theorem 7. For all (possibly partial) Boolean functions f ,
Adv(f) = O(d̃eg(f)2).
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Here d̃eg(f) is the approximate degree of f to bounded error.7 This relationship is
interesting, as it says that the positive-weight adversary method can never beat the polynomial
method by more than a quadratic factor. Conceivably, this can even be used as a lower
bound technique for the approximate degree of Boolean functions (which is a measure that is
often of interest even apart from quantum lower bounds). In fact, we prove a strengthening
of Theorem 7.
▶ Theorem 8. For all (possibly partial) Boolean functions f ,
d̃egϵ(f) ≥
√
(1 − 2ϵ) CAdv(f)
π
.
This version of the theorem is stronger, since Adv(f) ≤ CAdv(f). Finally, we prove a
quadratic relationship between the classical and quantum (positive-weight) adversary bounds.
▶ Theorem 9. For all (possibly partial) Boolean functions f ,
Adv(f) ≤ CAdv(f) ≤ 2 Adv(f)2.
We note that all of these new relations hold even for partial functions. This is unusual in
query complexity, where most relations hold only for total functions, and where most pairs
of measures can be exponentially separated in the partial function setting.
1.4 Our Techniques
We introduce several new techniques that we believe will be useful in future work on adversary
methods in communication complexity.
A lifting framework for adversary methods
One clear insight we contribute in this work is that lifting theorems for adversary method
can be fruitfully attacked in a “primal” way, and using information cost. To clarify, our
approach is to take a protocol Π for the lifted function f ◦ G, and to convert it into a solution
to the primal (i.e. minimization) program for the target adversary bound of f .
The primal program for an adversary method generally demands a non-negative weight
q(z, i) for each input string z ∈ {0, 1}n and each index i ∈ [n], such that a certain feasibility
constraint is satisfied for each pair (z, w) with f(z) ̸= f(w), and such that
∑
i∈[n] q(z, i) is
small for each input z. Our approach is to use an information cost measure to define q(z, i),
where the information is measured against a distribution µz over n-tuples of inputs to G
that evaluate to z, and where we only measure the information transmitted by the protocol
about the i-th input to G, conditioned on the previous bits.
We show that this way of getting a solution to the (minimization version of) the adversary
bound for f using a communication protocol for f ◦G suffices for lifting CAdv to a randomized
communication lower bound (with a constant-sized gadget), and that it also suffices for
getting some quantum lifting theorems. Our information cost approach is similar to the
approach taken in [7] to lower bound the information complexity of the AND function against
the uniform distribution over 0-inputs.
7 This is the minimum degree of an n-variate real polynomial p such that |p(x)| ∈ [0, 1] for all x ∈ {0, 1}n
and such that |p(x) − f(x)| ≤ 1/3 for all x in the domain of f .
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Product-to-sum reduction
One of the main tools we use in the proof of the lifting theorem for Adv1 is what we call
a product-to-sum reduction for quantum information cost. We show that if there is a
protocol Π which computes some communication function F such that the geometric mean√
QIC(Π, µ0) · QIC(Π, µ1) is small (where µ0 and µ1 are distributions over 0- and 1-inputs to
F ), then there is also a protocol Π′ which also computes F and for which the arithmetic mean
1
2 (QIC(Π
′, µ0) + QIC(Π′, µ1)) is small. In particular, a lower bound for the latter measure
implies a lower bound for the former. This is useful because the sum (or maximum) of the
two quantum information costs is a natural operation on quantum information measures
to which lower bound tools may apply, while the product is not; yet the product of these
information measures arises naturally in the study of adversary methods for a lifted query
function.
To prove our product-to-sum reduction, we employ a chain of reductions. First, we show
that if one of QIC(Π, µ0) or QIC(Π, µ1) is much smaller than the other, then we can use Π
to get a low-information protocol for OR ◦ F , the composition of the OR function with F .
Next, we use an argument motivated by [11]: we use Belov’s algorithm for the combinatorial
group testing problem [10] to use the low-information cost protocol for OR ◦ F to get a
low-information cost protocol for the task of computing n copies of F . Finally, we use an
argument from [41] to get a low-information cost protocol for F itself.
Connection to secure two-party computation
Another insight important for this work is that lifting theorems for quantum adversary
methods are related to quantum secure two-party computation, a cryptographic primitive.
This connection comes through the measure QICZ(G): for communication gadgets G for
which QICZ(G) > 0, we know that secure two-party computation of G is impossible (in an
“honest-but-curious” setting, where we require information-theoretic security); yet for such G,
we can then lift Adv1(f) to a lower bound on QCC(f ◦ G). We believe this result is likely to
extend to lifting theorems for other adversary methods in the future, though the dependence
on QICZ(G) > 0 may still remain.
We provide a minimax theorem for QICZ(G), giving an alternate characterization of the
measure. This minimax theorem is used in our lifting theorem, and may also be useful for a
future lower bound on QICZ(G) for some communication function G, which we view as an
interesting open problem.
Insights into query complexity
Our results for query complexity follow from the following insights. First, we show that
for partial functions, CAdv(f) is equivalent to the measure cfbs(f) (a fractional version of
critical block sensitivity [27]) by converting the primal versions of the two programs to each
other; this is not difficult to do, and the main contribution comes from (1) using the correct
definition of CAdv(f) (out of the several definitions in [6], which are not equivalent to each
other for partial functions), and (2) using the correct definition of cfbs(f) (which is a new
definition introduced in this work). We attribute one direction of this conversion to Krišjānis
Prūsis (personal communication).
Second, we show that the positive-weight adversary method Adv(f) is smaller than, but
quadratically related to, CAdv(f). Once again, this result is not difficult, but relies on
using the correct definition of CAdv(f) and on using the primal versions (i.e. minimization
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versions) of both programs. (Indeed, we use only the primal form of all the adversary methods
throughout this paper; one of our insights is that this primal form is more convenient for
proving structural properties of the adversary methods, including lifting theorems.)
Finally, we show that d̃eg(f) = Ω(
√
cfbs(f)), and hence d̃eg(f) = Ω(
√
Adv(f)), and this
holds even for partial functions. We do this by essentially reducing it to the task of showing
d̃eg(f) = Ω(
√
fbs(f)). The latter is already known [28]; however, it was only known for
total functions, whereas we need it to hold for partial functions as well. The problem is that
the previous proof relied on recursively composing f with itself, an operation which turns
the fractional block sensitivity fbs(f) into the block sensitivity bs(f); unfortunately, this
trick works only for total Boolean functions. Instead, we use a different trick for turning
fbs(f) into bs(f): we compose f with the promise-OR function, and show that the block
sensitivity of f ◦ PrOR is proportional to the fractional block sensitivity of f . We then
convert an arbitrary polynomial approximating f into a polynomial approximating f ◦PrOR
by composing it with a Chebyshev-like polynomial computing PrOR; finally, we appeal to
the known result that the square root of block sensitivity lower bounds approximate degree
to finish the proof.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Distance & information measures
We define all the distance and information measures for quantum states. The classical
versions can be obtained by making the corresponding registers classical.
The ℓ1 distance between two quantum states ρ and σ is defined as
∥ρ − σ∥1 = Tr
√
(ρ − σ)†(ρ − σ).
The entropy of a quantum state ρA on register A is defined as
H(A)ρ = − Tr(ρ log ρ).
For a state ρAB on registers AB, the conditional entropy of A given B is
H(A|B)ρ = H(AB)ρ − H(B)ρ.
Conditional entropy satisfies the following continuity bound [4]: if ρ and σ on registers AB
satisfy ∥ρ − σ∥1 ≤ ϵ, then
|H(A|B)ρ − H(A|B)σ| ≤ 4ϵ log |A| + 2h(ϵ)
where h(.) is the binary entropy function. For ρABC , we define the mutual information and
conditional mutual information as
I(A : B)ρ = H(A)ρ − H(A|B)ρ I(A : B|C) = H(A|C)ρ − H(A|BC)ρ.
Mutual information satisfies
0 ≤ I(A : B|C)ρ ≤ min{log |A|, log |B|}
and the chain rule
I(A : BC)ρ = I(A : B)ρ + I(A : C|B)ρ.
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2.2 Query complexity
In query complexity, the primary object of study are Boolean functions, which are functions
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} where n is a positive integer. Often, we will actually study partial
Boolean functions, which are defined on only a subset of {0, 1}n. We will use Dom(f) to
denote the domain of f ; this is a subset of {0, 1}n.
For a (possibly partial) Boolean function f , we use D(f), R(f), and Q(f) to denote
its deterministic query complexity, randomized query complexity (to bounded error), and
quantum query complexity (to bounded error), respectively. For the definition of these
measures, see [15], though we won’t use these definitions in this work.
2.2.1 Block sensitivity and its variants
We will use the following definitions.
Block notation. For a Boolean string x ∈ {0, 1}n and a set B ⊆ [n], we let xB denote the
string with the bits in B flipped; that is, xBi = xi for all i /∈ B and xBi = 1 − xi for all i ∈ B.
The set B is called a block.
Sensitive block. For a (possibly partial) Boolean function f on n bits and an input
x ∈ Dom(f), we say that a set B ⊆ [n] is a sensitive block for x (with respect to f) if
xB ∈ Dom(f) and f(xB) ̸= f(x).
Block sensitivity. The block sensitivity of a string x ∈ {0, 1}n with respect to a (possibly
partial) Boolean function f satisfying x ∈ Dom(f) is the maximum integer k such that there
are k blocks B1, B2, . . . , Bk ⊆ [n] which are all sensitive for x and which are all disjoint. This
is denoted bs(x, f).
Block sensitivity of a function. The block sensitivity of a (possibly partial) Boolean function
f is the maximum value of bs(x, f) over x ∈ Dom(f). This is denoted bs(f). Block sensitivity
was originally introduced by Nisan [34], and is discussed in the survey by Buhrman and de
Wolf [15].
Fractional block sensitivity. The fractional block sensitivity of a string x ∈ {0, 1}n with
respect to a (possibly partial) Boolean function f satisfying x ∈ Dom(f) is the maximum
possible sum of weights
∑
B wB, where the weights wB ≥ 0 are assigned to each sensitive
block of x and must satisfy
∑
B:i∈B wB ≤ 1 for all i ∈ [n]. This is denoted by fbs(x, f). The
fractional block sensitivity of a function f , denoted fbs(f), is the maximum value of fbs(x, f)
over x ∈ Dom(f). Fractional block sensitivity was defined by [2], but see also [28].
Critical block sensitivity. For a (possibly partial) Boolean function f , we say that a total
Boolean function f ′ is a completion of f if f ′(x) = f(x) for all x ∈ Dom(f). The critical






where the minimum is taken over completions f ′ of f . This measure was defined by [27]. It
equals bs(f) for total functions, but may be larger for partial functions.
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Critical fractional block sensitivity. For a (possibly partial) Boolean function f , we define






where the minimum is taken over completions f ′ of f . This measure has not previously
appeared in the literature.
2.2.2 Adversary bounds
Positive adversary bound. For a (possibly partial) Boolean function f , we define the
positive-weight adversary bound, denoted Adv(f), as the minimum of the following program.
We will have one non-negative weight q(x, i) for each x ∈ Dom(f) and each i ∈ [n]. We call
such a weight scheme feasible if, for all x, y ∈ Dom(f) with f(x) ̸= f(y), we have∑
i:xi ̸=yi
√
q(x, i)q(y, i) ≥ 1.
Then Adv(f) is defined as the minimum of maxx∈Dom(f)
∑
i∈[n] q(x, i) over feasible weight
schemes q(·, ·). A different version of the positive-weight adversary bound was defined in
[5], though the version we’ve currently defined appears in [30] and [39] (in the latter, our
definition is equivalent to MM(f)).
Classical adversary bound. For a (possibly partial) Boolean function f , we define the
classical adversary bound, denoted CAdv(f), as the minimum of the following program. We
will have one non-negative weight q(x, i) for each x ∈ Dom(f) and each i ∈ [n], as before.
We call such a weight scheme feasible if, for all x, y ∈ Dom(f) with f(x) ̸= f(y), we have∑
i:xi ̸=yi
min{q(x, i), q(y, i)} ≥ 1.
Then CAdv(f) is defined as the minimum of maxx∈Dom(f)
∑
i∈[n] q(x, i) over feasible weight
schemes q(·, ·). Observe that this definition is the same as that of Adv(f), except that the
feasibility constraint sums up the minimum of q(x, i) and q(y, i) instead of the geometric
mean. This feasibility constraint is harder to satisfy, and hence we have CAdv(f) ≥ Adv(f).
A different version of the classical adversary was defined in [1], though the version we’ve
currently defined appears in [30] and [6] (in the latter, our definition is equivalent to CMM(f)).
Singleton adversary bound. [3] introduced a simplified version of the quantum adversary
bound, which we denote Adv1(f). As in the other adversaries, this will be the minimum
over a program that has one non-negative weight q(x, i) for each pair of input x ∈ Dom(f)
and index i ∈ [n]. The objective value will once again be maxx∈Dom(f)
∑
i∈[n] q(x, i). The
only difference is the constraints: instead of placing a constraint for each x, y ∈ Dom(f)
with f(x) ̸= f(y), we only place this constraint for such x, y that have Hamming distance
exactly 1. Observe that this is a relaxation of the constraint in the definition of Adv(f), and
hence Adv1(f) ≤ Adv(f) for all (possibly partial) Boolean functions f .
2.3 A generalization to relations
So far, we’ve defined our query measures for partial Boolean functions. However, in many
cases we will be interested in studying relations, which are a generalization of partial Boolean
functions.
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In query complexity, a relation is a subset of {0, 1}n × Σ, where Σ is some finite output
alphabet. We will equate a relation f ⊆ {0, 1}n × Σ with a function that maps {0, 1}n to
subsets of Σ, so that for a string x ∈ {0, 1}n, the notation f(x) denotes {σ ∈ Σ : (x, σ) ∈ f}.
An algorithm which computes a relation f to error ϵ must have the guarantee that for inputs
x ∈ {0, 1}n, the algorithm outputs a symbol in f(x) with probability at least 1 − ϵ.
Relations are generalizations of partial functions. This is because we can represent a
partial function f with domain Dom(f) ⊆ {0, 1}n by a relation f ′ such that f ′(x) = {f(x)}
for x ∈ Dom(f) and f ′(x) = {0, 1} for x /∈ Dom(f). In other words, the relational version
f ′ of the partial function f will accept all input strings (it will be a total function), but it
will consider every output symbol to be valid when given an input not in Dom(f). This
essentially makes the inputs not in Dom(f) become trivial, and hence makes the relation f ′
intuitively equivalent to the partial function f .
We will generalize several of our query measures to relations.
Critical (fractional) block sensitivity. The original definition of cbs(f) from [27] actually
defined it for relations. We say that a total function f ′ : {0, 1}n → Σ is a completion of a
relation f ⊆ {0, 1}n ×Σ if (x, f ′(x)) ∈ f for all x ∈ {0, 1}n. In other words, f ′ is a completion
if it gives a fixed, valid output choice for each input to f . Next, we say an input x ∈ {0, 1}n
is critical if it has a unique valid output symbol in f ; that is, if |f(x)| = 1. We let crit(f)
denote the set of all critical inputs to f . (Note that if f is the relational version of a partial











where the minimizations are over completions f ′ of f . Observe that if f is the relational
version of a partial function, these definitions match the previous ones.
Adversary bounds. The adversary bounds easily generalize to relations: both the positive
adversary bound and the classical adversary bound will still be minimizations over weight
schemes q(x, i), with a non-negative weight assigned to each pair of input in {0, 1}n and
i ∈ [n]. The objective value to be minimized is the same as before: maxx∈{0,1}n
∑
i∈[n] q(x, i).
As for the constraints, we previously had one constraint for each pair of inputs x, y with
f(x) ̸= f(y). For relations, we will replace this condition with the condition f(x) ∩ f(y) = ∅
(that is, x and y have disjoint allowed-output-symbol sets). Hence the new constraint for
Adv(f) becomes that for all pairs x, y ∈ {0, 1}n with f(x) ∩ f(y) = ∅, we have∑
i:xi ̸=yi
√
q(x, i)q(y, i) ≥ 1.
Similarly, the constraint for CAdv(f) is that for all pairs x, y ∈ {0, 1}n with f(x) ∩ f(y) = ∅,
we have∑
i:xi ̸=yi
min{q(x, i), q(y, i)} ≥ 1,
and the constraint for Adv1(f) is similar.
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2.3.1 Degree measures
Degree of a function. For a (possibly partial) Boolean function f , we define its degree to
be the minimum degree of a real polynomial p which satisfies p(x) = f(x) for all x ∈ Dom(f)
as well as p(x) ∈ [0, 1] for all x ∈ {0, 1}n. We denote this by deg(f).
Approximate degree. For a (possibly partial) Boolean function f , we define its approximate
degree to error ϵ to be the minimum degree of a real polynomial p which satisfies |p(x)−f(x)| ≤
ϵ for all x ∈ Dom(f) as well as p(x) ∈ [0, 1] for all x ∈ {0, 1}n. We denote this by d̃egϵ(f).
When ϵ = 1/3, we omit it and write d̃eg(f).
These measures are both defined and discussed in the survey by Buhrman and de Wolf [15].
We note that for partial functions, some authors do not include the requirement that the
polynomial approximating the function is bounded outside of the promise set. Without
this requirement, one gets a smaller measure. In this work we will only use degree and
approximate degree to refer to the bounded versions of these measures.
We also note that approximate degree can be amplified: if a polynomial p approximates
a function f to error ϵ, then we can modify p to get a polynomial q which approximates f to
error ϵ′ < ϵ and which has degree that is at most a constant factor larger than the degree of
p (this constant factor will depend on ϵ and ϵ′).
2.3.2 Known relationships between measures












Figure 1 Relations between query complexity measures used in this work, applicable to partial
functions. An upwards line from M1(f) to M2(f) means that M1(f) = O(M2(f)) for all (possibly
partial) Boolean functions f . Red indicates new relationships proved in this work. We warn that
some of these relationships are false for relations; in particular, CAdv may be strictly larger than
cfbs and its square root may be incomparable to d̃eg for relations.
It is not hard to see that bs(f) is the smallest of the block sensitivity measures, and
cfbs(f) is the largest. We know [2, 27] that fbs(f) and cbs(f) both lower bound R(f) for
all (possibly partial) Boolean functions f ; in Section 6, we show that cfbs(f) is also a lower
bound.
We know [30, 39, 6] that Q(f) = Ω(Adv(f)) and R(f) = Ω(CAdv(f)). Although this it
not ordinarily stated for relations, both lower bounds hold when f is a relation as well. In
Section 6, we show that CAdv(f) = Θ(cfbs(f)) for all partial functions f , and we also show
that CAdv(f) = O(Adv(f)2) which holds for both partial functions and relations.
Approximate degree lower bounds quantum query complexity: Q(f) = Ω(d̃eg(f)). It is
known [9] that approximate degree is lower-bounded by
√
bs(f). Tal [40] showed that for
total functions, d̃eg(f) = Ω(
√
fbs(f)). In Section 6, we extend this result to partial functions,
and also prove that d̃eg(f) = Ω(
√
cfbs(f)).
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In conclusion, CAdv(f) turns out to be the same as cfbs(f) for partial functions, and its
square root lower bounds both Adv(f) and d̃eg(f), both of which are lower bounds on Q(f).
Without taking square roots, CAdv(f) is a lower bound on R(f) but not on Q(f).
When we move from partial functions to relations, the measure CAdv(f) appears to get
stronger in comparison to the other measures: it is strictly larger than cfbs(f), and appears
to be incomparable to d̃eg(f) (though defining the latter for relations is a bit tricky, and we
don’t do so in this work).
2.4 Communication complexity
In the communication model, two parties, Alice and Bob, are given inputs x ∈ X and
y ∈ Y respectively, and in the most general case the task is to jointly compute a relation
f ⊆ X × Y × Z by communicating with each other. In other words, on input (x, y), Alice
and Bob must output a symbol z ∈ Z such that (x, y, z) ∈ f . Without loss of generality, we
can assume Alice sends the first message, and Bob produces the output of the protocol.
In the classical randomized model, Alice and Bob are allowed to use shared randomness
R (and also possibly private randomness RA and RB) in order to achieve this. The cost of
a communication protocol Π, denoted by CC(Π) is the number of bits exchanged between
Alice and Bob. The randomized communication complexity of a relation f with error ϵ,
denoted by RCCϵ (f), is defined as the minimum CC(Π) of a randomized protocol Π that
computes f with error at most ϵ on every input.
Classical information complexity. The information complexity of a protocol with inputs
X, Y according to µ, shared randomness R and transcript Π is given by
IC(Π, µ) = I(X : Π|Y R)µ + I(Y : Π|XR)µ.
For any µ we have, IC(Π, µ) ≤ CC(Π).
Quantum communication complexity. In a quantum protocol Π, Alice and Bob initially
share an entangled state on registers A0B0, and they get inputs x and y from a distribution








where the registers X̃ and Ỹ purify X and Y and are inaccessible to either party. In the
t-th round of the protocol, if t is odd, Alice applies a unitary Ut : A′t−1Ct−1 → A′tCt, on
her input, her memory register A′t−1 and the message Ct−1 from Bob in the previous round
(where A′0 = XA0 and C0 is empty), to generate the new message Ct, which she sends to
Bob, and new memory register A′t. Similarly, if t is even, then Bob applies the unitary
Ut : B′t−1Ct−1 → B′tCt and sends Ct to Alice. It is easy to see that B′t = B′t−1 for odd t, and
A′t = A′t−1 for even t. We can assume that the protocol is safe, i.e., for all t, A′t = XAt and









[31] (Proposition 9) showed that making a protocol safe does not decrease its QIC (defined
below), so we shall often work with protocols of this form.
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The quantum communication cost of a protocol Π, denoted by QCC(Π), is the total
number of qubits exchanged between Alice and Bob in the protocol, i.e.,
∑
t log |Ct|. The
quantum communication complexity of f with error ϵ, denoted by QCC(f), is defined as the
minimum QCC(Π) of a quantum protocol Π that computes f with error at most ϵ on every
input.
Quantum information complexity. Given a quantum protocol Π as described above with




I(X̃Ỹ : Ct|Y B′t)Ψt +
∑
t even
I(X̃Ỹ : Ct|XA′t)Ψt .











I(X : BtCt|Y )Ψt +
∑
t even
I(Y : AtCt|X)Ψt (for safe protocols).
For brevity, we shall often only use the classical input distribution µ as the subscript, or
drop the subscript entirely, for these information quantities.
It was proved in [31], that for an r-round protocol Πr, HQIC and QIC satisfy the following
relation:
QIC(Πr, µ) ≥ 1
r
HQIC(Πr, µ) ≥ 12r QIC(Π
r, µ).
Moreover, for any µ, QIC(Π, µ) ≤ QCC(Π).
3 Lifting the classical adversary
3.1 The gadget and its properties
The gadget we use is the same one used in [24], called VER in that work. This is the function
VER : {0, 1}2 × {0, 1}2 → {0, 1} defined by G(x, y) = 1 if and only if x + y is equivalent to 2
or 3 modulo 4, where x, y ∈ {0, 1}2 are interpreted as binary representations of integers in
{0, 1, 2, 3}. This gadget has the property of being versatile, which means that it satisfies the
following three properties:
1. Flippability: given any input (x, y), Alice and Bob can perform a local operation on their
respective inputs (without communicating) to get (x′, y′) such that G(x′, y′) = 1−G(x, y).
2. Random self-reducibility: given any input (x, y), Alice and Bob can use shared random-
ness (without communicating) to generate (x′, y′) which is uniformly distributed over
G−1(G(x, y)). That is, Alice and Bob can convert any 0-input into a random 0-input and
any 1-input into a random 1-input, without any communication. More formally, if the
domain of G is X × Y , we require a probability distribution νG over pairs of permutations
in SX ×SY such that for each (x, y) ∈ X ×Y , sampling (σA, σB) from νG and constructing
the pair (σA(x), σB(y)) gives the uniform distribution over G−1(G(x, y)).
3. Non-triviality: the function G contains AND2 as a sub-function (and by flippability, it
also contains OR2 as a sub-function).
These three properties were established in [24] for the function VER; a gadget which
satisfies them is called versatile. Our lifting proof will work for any versatile gadget G. We
will need the following simple lemma, which allows us to generate n-tuples of inputs to G that
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evaluate to either a string s ∈ {0, 1}n or its complement ŝ ∈ {0, 1}n. We use the notation
G−1(s) to denote the set of all n-tuples of inputs to G that together evaluate to s ∈ {0, 1}n;
this abuses notation slightly (we would technically need to write (G⊕n)−1(s), where G⊕n is
the function we get by evaluating n independent inputs to G).
▶ Lemma 10. Let s ∈ {0, 1}m be a given string and G be a versatile gadget. Then there is a
protocol with no communication using shared randomness between Alice and Bob, who receive
inputs (a, b) in the domain of G such that
If G(a, b) = 0, Alice and Bob produce output strings (x, y) that are uniformly distributed
in G−1(s)
If G(a, b) = 1, Alice and Bob produce output strings (x, y) that are uniformly distributed
in G−1(ŝ) = G−1(s ⊕ 1m).
Proof. Alice and Bob share independent instances of the permutations νG, σA and σB as
randomness. Applying independent instances of νG, Alice and Bob can produce (x′, y′)
that are uniformly distributed in G−1((G(a, b))m): this is done by applying m independent
instances of σA and σB from νG to a and b respectively. Now Alice and Bob know where s
differs from 0m. By applying independent instances of the local flipping operation on x′ and
y′ at these locations, they can negate the output of G. It is clear the resultant string (x, y)
is uniformly distributed in G−1(s) if G(a, b) = 0 and in G−1(ŝ) if G(a, b) = 1. ◀
We additionally have the following lemma, which uses the non-triviality property of a
versatile gadget.
▶ Lemma 11. If G is a constant-sized non-trivial gadget (containing AND2 and OR2 as
subfunctions), and µ0 and µ1 are uniform distributions over its 0- and 1-inputs, then any
classical protocol Π for computing G with bounded error has IC(Π, µ0), IC(Π, µ1) = Ω(1).
Proof. G contains the AND2 function, and µ0 puts uniform Ω(1) weight on the 0-inputs
of the AND2 subfunction. [8] showed that any protocol computing the AND2 function
must have Ω(1) information cost with respect to the distribution that puts 1/3 weight on all
0-inputs of the AND2 function. Hence any protocol for G must also have IC(Π, µ0) = Ω(1).
Similarly, by considering the fact that G contains the OR2 function, we can show that
IC(Π, µ1) = Ω(1). ◀
Although we only need a single versatile gadget, such as VER, we will briefly remark
that there is actually an infinite family of versatile gadgets, and that this family is universal
(i.e. every communication function is a sub-function of some gadget in the family).
▶ Lemma 12. There is a universal family of versatile gadgets.
Proof. For ease of notation, let G denote VER. For each n ∈ N+, we define Gn to
be Parityn ◦ G. Note that Gn has the signature {0, 1}2n × {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}. We
observe that Gn is versatile for each n ∈ N+. This is because, given a single input
((x1, x2, . . . , xn), (y1, y2, . . . , yn)) to Gn with xi, yi ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} for each i ∈ [n], Alice and
Bob can locally generate the uniform distribution over all inputs with the same Gn-value.
They can do this by first negating a random subset of the positions i of even size (using the
flippability property of VER), and then converting each of the n resulting inputs to G into
a random input to G with the same G-value.
Suppose z is the n-bit string with zi = G(xi, yi). Then flipping a random even subset of
the bits of z is equivalent to generating a random string w that has the same parity as z.
It follows that the above procedure generates a random input to Gn that has the same Gn
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value as the original input, meaning that Gn is random self-reducible. By flipping any single
gadget G within Gn, we can negate Gn, so it is also flippable. Finally, since Gn contains G
as a sub-function, it also contains AND as a sub-function, so Gn is versatile for each n ∈ N+.
It remains to show that {Gn}n is universal. We note that since G contains AND as a
sub-function, and since Gn = Parityn ◦ G, the function Gn contains Parityn ◦ AND as a
sub-function. The latter is the inner product function IPn on n bits, which is well-known to
be universal. Hence Gn is also universal. ◀
3.2 The lifting theorem
▶ Theorem 13. Let G be a constant-sized versatile gadget such as VER, and let f : {0, 1}n →
Σ be a relation. Then RCC(f ◦ G) = Ω(CAdv(f)).
Proof. Let Π be a randomized protocol for f ◦G which uses T rounds of communication (with
one bit sent each round), and successfully computes f ◦ G with probability at least 1 − ϵ/2 for
each input. Consider inputs XY distributed according to µz = µz1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ µzn , where each
µzi is the uniform distribution over (xi, yi) in G−1(zi). Suppose Π uses public randomness
R which is independent of the inputs XY . We introduce the dependency-breaking random
variables D and U [8] in the following way: D is independent of X, Y, R and is uniformly
distributed on {0, 1}n. For each i ∈ [n], if Di = 0, then Ui = Xi, and if Di = 1, then
Ui = Yi. Defined this way, given DiUi, Xi and Yi are independent under µz. We shall use
this algorithm to give a weight scheme q′(z, i):
q′(z, i) = I(Xi : Π|X<iY DUR)µz + I(Xi : Π|Y<iXDUR)µz
where X<i denotes X1 . . . Xi−1, and similarly for Y<i. Clearly q is non-negative, and we
shall show that∑
i:zi ̸=wi
min{q′(z, i), q′(w, i)} = Ω(1)
for all z, w such that f(z) ∩ f(w) = ∅, where the constant in the Ω(1) is universal. Using
this constant to normalize q′(z, i), we get q(z, i) which is a valid weight scheme. Since for
any fixed value of DU = du, I(X : Π|Y R)µzdu is an information cost,∑
i∈[n]
q′(z, i) = I(X : Π|Y DUR)µz + I(Y : Π|XDUR)µz ≤ CC(Π),












where the minimization is over all valid weight schemes. This proves the result.
Let z and w be two inputs to f such that f(z) ∩ f(w) = ∅. Suppose z and w differ on
indices in the block B. Let B1 be the subset of indices in B where min{q′(z, i), q′(w, i)} is
achieved by q′(z, i), and B2 be the subset where the minimum is achieved by q′(w, i). For
an index i ∈ B1, let B1i denote B1 ∩ [i − 1], and B2i denote B2 ∩ [i − 1]. We also use B1,c to
denote [n] \ B1, and B1,ci to denote [i − 1] \ B1i . Then,
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∑
i:zi ̸=wi





























YB2DB2,cUB2,cR)µw + I(Yi : Π|YB2i XB2DB2,cUB2,cR)µw )
= 12(I(XB
1 : Π|YB1DB1,cUB1,cR)µz + I(YB1 : Π|XB1DB1,cUB2,cR)µz )
+ 12(I(XB
2 : Π|YB2DB2,cUB2,cR)µw + I(YB2 : Π|XB2DB2,cUB2,cR)µw ). (1)
Above, equality (1) follows by using the definition of DiUi. The inequality (2) follows from
the fact that given Yi, Xi is independent of all other Xj , Yj Dj and Uj under both the z
and w distributions, hence I(Yi : Π|Y<iX(DU)−iR)µz ≥ I(Yi : Π|YB1i XB1(DU)B1,cR)µz , and
equivalent inequalities hold for the other terms.
Consider v ∈ {0, 1}n which agrees with w on the bits in B1, with z on the bits in B2, and
with both of them outside B. Since f(z) and f(w) are disjoint, at least one of the following
must be true:
1. Pr(x,y)∼µv [Π(x, y) ∈ f(z)] ≤ 12
2. Pr(x,y)∼µv [Π(x, y) ∈ f(w)] ≤ 12 .
In case 1, we shall give a protocol Π′ that computes G correctly with probability at least
1 − ϵ in the worst case, such that
IC(Π′, µ0) = O(I(XB1 : Π|YB1DB1,cUB1,cR)µz + I(YB1 : Π|XB1DB1,cUB1,cR)µz ).
Similarly, in case 2, we can use Π to give a protocol Π′′ for G, such that
IC(Π′′, µ1) = O(I(XB2 : Π|YB2DB2,cUB2,cR)µw + I(YB2 : Π|XB2DB2,cUB2,cR)µw ).
Due to equation (1) and Lemma 11, this proves the theorem.
In fact we only show how to construct the protocol Π′ in case 1; the construction of
Π′′ is identical. Since z is in the domain of f and Π has worst case correctness for f ◦ G,
we must have Pr(x,y)∼µz [Π(x, y) ∈ f(z)] ≥ 1 − ϵ/2. Therefore, in case 1, Π can distinguish
between samples from µz and µv on average: on getting a sample from µz or µv, we can run
Π to see if it gives an output in f(z) or not, and output z or v accordingly. This average
distinguishing probability can be boosted by running Π multiple times.
In Π′, Alice and Bob will share RDB1,cUB1,cRARB as randomness, where we use RA and
RB to denote Alice and Bob’s part of the shared randomness from Lemma 10, required to
generate zB1 if G(a, b) = 0 and vB1 if G(a, b) = 1. On input (a, b) to G, Alice and Bob do
the following k times for k = 2ϵ2 ln(1/ϵ) :
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Alice sets xB1 = RA(a) and Bob sets yB1 = RB(b).
Alice samples xB1,c and Bob yB1,c from private randomness, so that G|B
1,c|(xB1,c , yB1,c)
= zB1,c . They can do this since given (DU)B1,c , XB1,c and YB1,c are independent under
µz and µv.
They run Π on this (x, y) and generate the corresponding output.
(There are k independent instances of the D, U, RA, RB variables for each run above, but we
denote all of them the same way for brevity.) The final output of Π′ is 1 if the number of
runs which have given an output in f(z) is at least (1 − ϵ)k, and 0 otherwise.
Clearly if G(a, b) = 0, then (x, y) generated this way is uniformly distributed in the
support of µz, and if G(a, b) = 1, then (x, y) is uniform in the support of µv. Calling the
protocol in the i-th round of Π′, Πi, notice that the transcript of each Πi is independent
of ARA, where A is the random variable for Alice’s input, given the generated XB1 (and
this holds true even conditioned on BRBDB1,cUB1,cR). Moreover, both XB1 and Πi are
independent of BRB given YB1 and of YB1 given BRB (even conditioned on DB1UB1R).
Let µ0,z denote the distribution of ABRARB(DU)B1,c when G(a, b) = 0, which induces the
distribution µzB1 on XB1YB1 . Hence,
I(A : Πi|BRARB(DU)B1R)µ0,z ≤ I(ARA : Πi|BRB(DU)B1,cR)µ0,z
(1)
≤ I(XB1 : Πi|BRB(DU)B1,cR)µ0,z
(2)
≤ I(XB1 : Πi|YB1BRB(DU)B1,cR)µ0,z
(3)= I(XB1 : Πi|YB1(DU)B1,cR)µ0,z
(4)= I(XB1 : Π|YB1(DU)B1,cR)µz .
where inequality (1) follows from the fact that I(U ′ : V |W ) ≤ I(U : V |W ) if U ′ is independent
of V given UW , (2) follows from the fact that I(U : V |W ) ≤ I(U : V |WW ′) if V is
independent of W ′ given W , and (3) follows from I(U : V |WW ′) = I(U : V |W ′) if U and V
are both independent of W given W ′. Finally, (4) follows from the definition of Πi and the
the fact that the variables AB don’t appear in the expression, so we can switch from µ0,z to
µz. Similarly,
I(B : Πi|ARARB(DU)B1,cR)µ0,z ≤ I(YB1 : Π|XB1(DU)B1,cR)µz ,
which lets us conclude that
IC(Πi, µ0) ≤ I(XB1 : Π|YB1(DU)B1,cR)µz + I(YB1 : Π|XB1(DU)B1,cR)µz .
Thus IC(Π′, µ0) is at most k(I(XB1 : Π|YB1(DU)B1,cR)µz +I(YB1 : Π|XB1(DU)B1,cR)µz ).
Now let us analyze the worst case error made by Π′. Since the output of Πi on (a, b)
is expected output of Π on (x, y) uniformly sampled from either µz or µv, Πi produces an
output in f(z) on (a, b) such that G(a, b) = 0 with probability at least 1 − ϵ/2, and on
(a, b) such that G(a, b) = 1 with probability at most 12 . Hence by the Hoeffding bound, the
probability of (1 − ϵ)k many 0 outputs in the first case is at least
1 − e−ϵ
2k/2 ≥ 1 − ϵ
and in the second case is at most
e−2(1/2−ϵ)
2k ≤ ϵ.
Hence the probability of error on either input is at most ϵ. ◀
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4 Quantum bounded-round lifting
The following result, analogous to Lemma 11 except with round dependence, holds in the
quantum case.
▶ Lemma 14. Let G be a constant-sized gadget which contains AND2 and OR2 as sub-
functions, and µ0 and µ1 be uniform distributions over its 0- and 1-inputs. Then any r-round
quantum protocol Π for computing G with bounded error has QIC(Π, µ0), QIC(Π, µ1) =
Ω̃(1/r).
The lemma has a similar proof to the classical case, and invokes the near-optimal lower
bound for the quantum information cost of the AND2 and OR2 functions due to [12].
▶ Theorem 15. If G is a constant-sized versatile gadget, then QCCr(f ◦G) = Ω̃(CAdv(f)/r2).

























HQIC(Π, µz) ≤ QIC(Π, µz) ≤ QCC(Π).
Clearly q′(z, i) is non-negative, and for all z, w such that f(z) ∩ f(w) = ∅, we shall show
that ∑
i:zi ̸=wi
min{q′(z, i), q′(w, i)} = Ω̃(1/r). (2)
Thus, defining q(z, i) as our weight scheme by normalizing q′(z, i) with the r factor, we get
the required result.
Showing (2) proceeds very similar to the classical case. For two inputs z, w to f such
that f(z) ∩ f(w) = ∅, which differ on the bits in block B, let B1 ⊆ B be the indices where
min{q′(z, i), q′(w, i)} is achieved by q′(z, i), and B2 ⊆ B be the indices where it is achieved
by q′(w, i). By the same chain of inequalities as in the classical case, we have∑
i:zi ̸=wi


















Note that if we had used a QIC-based definition, instead of an HQIC-based definition, for
q′(z, i), where we conditioned on the Bt, At registers, the above chain of inequalities would
not have been valid, since Xi is not independent of XjYjDjUj at j ̸= i conditioned on Bt,
and the same holds for Yi.
Define the hybrid input v which agrees with w on the bits in B1, with z on the bits in B2
and with both outside B. At least one of the following is true of v:
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1. Pr(x,y)∼µv [Π(x, y) ∈ f(z)] ≤ 12
2. Pr(x,y)∼µv [Π(x, y) ∈ f(w)] ≤ 12 .
In case 1, we shall give a protocol Π′ that computes G correctly with probability at least






















The number of rounds in Π′ and Π′′ will be kr, for k = 2ϵ2 ln(1/ϵ). This proves the theorem
due to Lemma 14, and the fact that HQIC(Π′, µ) = Ω(QIC(Π′, µ)) for any µ.
We only describe the protocol Π′. In Π′, Alice and Bob will share the initial entangled
state of Π, as well as DB1,cUB1,cRARB as randomness, where RA and RB are Alice and Bob’s
parts of the shared randomness from Lemma 10. Note that sharing randomness is equivalent
to sharing an entangled state whose Schmidt coefficients are equal to the square roots of the
corresponding probabilities, and locally measuring this state to get classical variables to use.
We denote the inputs of Π′ by (x′, y′) here to avoid confusion with the memory registers. On
input (x′, y′), Alice and Bob do the following k times in Π′:
Alice sets xB1 = RA(x′) and Bob sets yB1 = RB(y′).
Alice samples xB1,c and Bob samples yB1,c from private randomness (this can be done
unitarily), so that G|B1,c|(xB1,c , yB1,c) = zB1,c . They can do this since given (DU)B1,c ,
XB1,c and YB1,c are independent under µz and µv.
They run Π on this (x, y) and generate the corresponding output.
The final output of Π′ is 1 if the number of runs which have given an output in f(z) is at
least (1 − ϵ)k, and 0 otherwise.
Let µ0,z denote the distribution of X ′Y ′RARB(DU)B1,c when G(x′, y′) = 0, which induces
µzB1 on XB1YB1 . Let Ct,i denote the message and At,i, Bt,i the memory registers of the i-th
run of Π in Π′, which we denote by Πi. (There are also independent D, U, RA, RB variables
for each run, but we drop the i dependence here.) For every i, and an odd round t, we have
similar to the classical case,
I(X ′ : Bt,iCt,i|Y ′RARB(DU)B1,c)µ0,z ≤ I(XB1 : BtCt|YB1(DU)B1,c)µz
Similarly, for even t,





I(XB1 : BtCt|YB1(DU)B1,c)µz +
∑
t even
I(YB1 : AtCt|XB1(DU)B1,c)µz .
Finally, HQIC(Π′, µ0) = k HQIC(Πi, µ0).
Since z is in the domain of f and Π is correct for f ◦ G with probability at least 1 − ϵ/2,
we have Pr(x,y)∼µz [Π(x, y) ∈ f(z)] ≥ 1 − ϵ/2, and the probability when (x, y) is sampled
according to µv instead is at most 12 . Therefore, by the definition of Π
′ and the Hoeffding
bound, Π′ is correct for G with probability at least 1 − ϵ. This completes the proof. ◀
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5 Towards a full quantum adversary lifting theorem
In this section, we will prove a conditional lifting theorem for a somewhat weak quantum
adversary method, Adv1. The goal of this section is primarily to introduce some tools that we
believe will be helpful in eventually proving a lifting theorem for the positive-weight quantum
adversary method (hopefully with a constant-sized gadget such as the VER). Specifically, we
prove a product-to-sum reduction for quantum information cost in Section 5.2, which should
be helpful for handling the
√
q(z, i)q(w, i) terms that occur in the positive-weight adversary
method; indeed, we use this product-to-sum reduction for our Adv1 lifting theorem. We
also show how lifting theorems for quantum adversary methods are related to 2-party secure
communication.
We now introduce the definition of QICZ(G), our measure of the information leak that
must happen in any purported 2-party secure computation of G.
▶ Definition 16. Let G : X × Y → {0, 1} be a communication function. Let P be the set of
all communication protocols which solve G to worst-case error 1/3. Let ∆0 be the set of all
probability distributions over G−1(0), and let ∆1 be the set of all probability distributions






We note that since QIC(Π, ·) is a continuous function of distributions [12], the inner
supremum is actually attained as a maximum. We can now state our lifting theorem, as
follows.
▶ Theorem 17. Let f : {0, 1}n → Σ be a relation (where n ∈ N+ and Σ is a finite alphabet)
and let G : X × Y → {0, 1} be a communication function which contains both AND2 and
OR2 as subfunctions. Then
QCC(f ◦ G) = Ω̃(Adv1(f) QICZ(G)).
5.1 A minimax for QICZ
Before attacking the proof of Theorem 17, we first prove a minimax theorem for the measure
QICZ(G), giving an alternate characterization of it. To do so, we invoke Sion’s minimax
theorem [38].
▶ Fact 18 (Sion’s minimax). Let V1 and V2 be real topological vector spaces, and let X ⊆ V1











To understand the statement of this theorem, we need a few definitions:
1. A real-valued function ϕ is convex if ϕ(λx1 + (1 − λ)x2) ≤ λϕ(x1) + (1 − λ)ϕ(x2) for all
x1, x2 ∈ Dom(ϕ) and all λ ∈ (0, 1).
2. A real-valued function ϕ is concave if ϕ(λx1 + (1 − λ)x2) ≥ λϕ(x1) + (1 − λ)ϕ(x2) for all
x1, x2 ∈ Dom(ϕ) and all λ ∈ (0, 1).
3. A function α : X × Y → R is saddle if α(·, y) is convex as a function of x for each fixed
y ∈ Y , and if α(x, ·) is concave as a function of y for each fixed x ∈ X.
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4. A real-valued function ϕ is upper semicontinuous at a point x if for any ϵ > 0, there
exists a neighborhood U of x such that for all x′ ∈ U , we have ϕ(x′) < ϕ(x) + ϵ.
5. A real-valued function ϕ is lower semicontinuous at a point x if for any ϵ > 0, there exists
a neighborhood U of x such that for all x′ ∈ U , we have ϕ(x′) > ϕ(x) − ϵ.
6. A function α : X × Y → R is semicontinuous if α(·, y) is lower semicontinuous over all of
X for each y ∈ Y and if α(x, ·) is upper semicontinuous over all of Y for each x ∈ X.
We now use Sion’s minimax theorem to prove a minimax theorem for QICZ.
▶ Theorem 19. Fix a communication function G. Let P be the set of all protocols which
solve G to worst-case error 1/3, let ∆0 be the set of probability distributions over 0-inputs to











QIC(Π, µ0) + QIC(Π, µ1).
Moreover, the maximum is attained.
Proof. We will aim to use Sion’s minimax theorem [38]. To this end, we start with a bit of
formalism. The set P of protocols is, of course, an infinite set, and has somewhat complicated
structure. In order to apply a minimax theorem, however, we want to switch over to a convex
subset of a real topological vector space. To do so, we first consider the free real vector space
over P , which we denote by V (P ). This is the real vector space consisting of all formal
(finite) linear combinations of elements in P ; the set P is a basis of this vector space. We
further consider the 1-norm on this space, where we define the 1-norm of a formal (finite)
linear combination as the sum of absolute values of coefficients in the linear combination.
This norm induces a topology over V (P ), making it a real topological vector space.
Our set of algorithms will be the subset of V (P ) consisting of vectors with norm 1 that
have non-negative coefficients in the linear combination; we denote this subset by R. It is not
hard to see that the elements of R are simply all the finite-support probability distributions
over protocols in P . We observe that R is a convex set. This will be the set over which we
take the infimum in Sion’s minimax theorem.
Observe that since the input set Dom(G) of G is finite, the sets ∆0 and ∆1 are both
convex, compact subsets of the real vector space R| Dom(G)|, which has a standard topology.
It follows that the set ∆0 × ∆1 is also convex and compact (as a subset of the real topological
vector space R2| Dom(G)|). This will be the set over which we take the supremum in Sion’s
minimax.
Let A ∈ R. This is a finite-support probability distribution over protocols in P ; however,
it is always possible to use shared randomness to construct a single protocol ΠA ∈ P
whose behavior exactly matches that of A (that is, in ΠA, Alice and Bob will sample a
protocol from A using shared randomness, and then run that protocol). Finally, we define
α : R × (∆0 × ∆1) → [0, ∞) by setting
α(A, (µ0, µ1)) := QIC(ΠA, µ0) + QIC(ΠA, µ1).
This will be the function on which we apply Sion’s minimax.
It remains to show that α is semicontinuous and quasisaddle. It is not hard to see that
the sum of two semicontinuous functions (on the same domain) is semicontinuous, and that
the sum of two saddle functions is saddle. It will therefore be sufficient to show that QIC is
semicontinuous and saddle.
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In [41] (Lemma 5), it was shown that QIC(·, µ) is linear (and hence convex) for each µ.
In [41] (Lemma 6), it was shown that QIC(Π, ·) is concave. Hence QIC is saddle, and
therefore so is α. In [12] (Lemma 4.8), it was shown that QIC(Π, ·) is continuous.
It remains to show the lower semicontinuity of QIC(·, µ). More explicitly, for each fixed
distribution µ, each A ∈ R and each ϵ > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that for all A′ ∈ R with
∥A − A′∥1 < δ, we have QIC(ΠA′ , µ) > QIC(ΠA, µ) − ϵ.
We can write A = (1−p)B+pC and A′ = (1−p)B+pC ′ where B, C, C ′ ∈ R, and (C, C ′) is
a pair of distributions with disjoint support. In other words, B is the probability distribution
consisting of the (normalized) overlap between A and A′, while C and C ′ are the probability
distributions we get from subtracting out the overlap from A and from A′ respectively.
If ∥A − A′∥1 < δ, we must have p < δ/2. Now, by the linearity of QIC(·, µ), we have
QIC(ΠA, µ) = (1 − p) QIC(ΠB , µ) + p QIC(ΠC , µ) and QIC(ΠA′ , µ) = (1 − p) QIC(ΠB , µ) +
p QIC(ΠC′ , µ). We want to choose δ so that QIC(ΠA′ , µ) > QIC(ΠA, µ) − ϵ, or equivalently,
so that QIC(ΠC′ , µ) > QIC(ΠC , µ) − ϵ/p. This rearranges to wanting ϵ/p > QIC(ΠC , µ) −
QIC(ΠC′ , µ); hence it is sufficient to choose δ so that 2ϵ/δ > QIC(ΠC , µ) − QIC(ΠC′ , µ). It
is clear that such δ can always be chosen, as QIC(ΠC , µ) must be finite.











QIC(ΠA, µ0) + QIC(ΠA, µ1).
Since R contains P as a subset, and since every protocol in R can be converted into an
equivalent protocol in P , taking an infimum over A ∈ R is the same as taking an infimum
over Π ∈ P . It is then clear that the left hand side is at least QIC(G) (since the latter has
only one QIC(Π, µ0) or QIC(Π, µ1) term instead of both), but no more than twice QIC(G)
(since the maximum of QIC(Π, µ0) and QIC(Π, µ1) is at least the average of the two). Hence
the desired result follows. The attainment of the maximum comes from the fact that an upper
semicontinuous function on a nonempty compact set attains is maximum, combined with the
fact that a pointwise infimum of upper semicontinuous functions is upper semicontinuous. ◀
5.2 Product-to-sum reduction for quantum information
In order to prove Theorem 17, we will need a way to bound the product of quantum
information cost on the “0-input” side and the quantum information cost on the “1-input”
side. We start with the following definition.
▶ Definition 20. Let G be a communication function. We say a distribution µ is nontrivial
for G if for any protocol Π computing G (to bounded error against worst-case inputs), it
holds that QIC(Π, µ) > 1/ poly(r), where r is the number of rounds of Π. (In particular, it
should not be possible to achieve QIC(Π, µ) = 0 if µ is nontrivial.)
Using this definition, we state the following theorem, which is the main result of this
subsection.
▶ Theorem 21. Let G be a gadget, let µ0 and µ1 be nontrivial 0- and 1-distributions for G,
and let Π be a protocol solving G (to bounded error against worst-case inputs). Then there is
a protocol Π′ which also solves G (to bounded error against worst-case inputs) which satisfies
QIC(Π′, µ0) + QIC(Π′, µ1) = O
(√
QIC(Π, µ0) QIC(Π, µ1) · polylog r
)
,
where r is the number of rounds of Π and where the constant in the big-O is universal.
Moreover, the number of rounds of Π′ is polynomial in that of Π.
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Before we prove this, we will need a few lemmas. In the following, we will use G⊕n to denote
the direct sum of n copies of G; that is, if G : X ×Y → {0, 1}, then G⊕ : (X n)×(Yn) → {0, 1}n
is the function that takes in n separate copies to G and outputs n separate outputs from G.
▶ Lemma 22. Let (G, µ0, µ1) be any gadget, 0-distribution, and 1-distribution, let n ∈ N+,
and let Π be a protocol which solves G⊕n (to bounded error against worst-case inputs). Then
there is a protocol Π′ which solves G (to bounded error against worst-case inputs) which
satisfies






QIC (Π, µz) .
Proof. Let for z ∈ {0, 1}n, let Πi,z be the protocol which: takes an input to G; artificially
generates n − 1 inputs from µzj for j ̸= i for all the gadgets G except at position i; places
the true input at position i; runs Π on the resulting input to G⊕n; traces out all the outputs
except for position i; and returns the result. Note that Πi,z does not depend on the value of
zi, but depends on the rest of z. If we use zi to denote the string x with i flipped, we have
Πi,z = Πi,zi for all x and i.
[41] (Lemma 4) showed that for all x ∈ {0, 1}n,
n∑
i=1
QIC(Πi,z, µzi) = QIC (Π, µz) .






x∈{0,1}n Πi,z. Again by [41] (Lemma 5),










































QIC (Π, µz) . ◀
▶ Lemma 23. Let G1, G2, . . . , Gn be any sequence of communication tasks, and for each
i ∈ [n] let Πi be a protocol which solves Gi (to bounded error against worst-case inputs).
Let F be a (possibly partial) query function on n bits, and let Q be a T -query quantum
query algorithm computing F (to bounded error against worst-case inputs). Then there is a
protocol Π′ computing F ◦ {Gi}i (to bounded error against worst-case inputs) such that for
any z ∈ Dom(F ) and any distribution µz supported on (G1 ⊕ G2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Gn)−1(z), we have
QIC(Π′, µz) = Õ
(





where µiz is the marginal of µz on gadget number i.
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Proof. Let Π̂i be the amplified and purified version of Πi, reducing its worst-case error on G
to δ/T 10 log n and using the uncomputing trick to clean up garbage (δ will be chosen later).
Then the information cost of Π̂i against any fixed distribution increases by a factor of at
most O(log T + log log n + log 1/δ) compared to Πi. Next, Π′ be the protocol where Alice
runs the query algorithm for F , and whenever she needs to make a query i, she sends i to
Bob and they compute gadget number i using Π̂i. Since F succeeds with bounded error on
worst-case inputs and since Π̂i has such a low probability of error, the protocol Π′ correctly
computes F ◦ G on worst-case inputs.
Fix z ∈ Dom(F ) and µz supported on (G⊕n)−1(z). We will expand out QIC(Π′, µz). In
round t ≤ T of the query algorithm, there are two types of messages between Alice and
Bob: one message from Alice to Bob containing a copy Et of the query register Dt for step
t ≤ T , which Alice knows from her simulation of the algorithm Q for F ; and all the messages
between Alice and Bob implementing Π̂i. Denote those messages by Ct,j . Note that Et also
gets passed back from Bob to Alice at the end of each round for cleanup purposes.
We name the rest of the registers. Let the input registers be X and Y , and let Alice hold
register Dt specifying the position to query at round t, a work register Ãt related to the
implementation of the algorithm Q for f (which stays untouched for all j), and register At,j
related to the implementation of the Π̂i protocols for round t. Bob holds query register Et
(passed from Alice, untouched for all j) as well as work register Bt,j for the implementation
of the Π̂i protocols. Let R be the purification register. Then using r to denote the index of



















I(X̃Ỹ : Ct,j |XAt,jDtÃt)Ψt,jz .
For the terms I(X̃Ỹ : Et|Y Bt,0)Ψtz and I(X̃Ỹ : Et|XAt,rÃtDt)Ψtz , we note that Bt,0 and
At,r are the start state on Bob’s side and the end state on Alice’s side for Π̂, and can be
assumed to be independent of all other registers. Hence we shall ignore the registers Bt,0 and
At,r in the conditioning systems. Let |Φt⟩ that is obtained by replacing the ÃtDtEt registers
of |Ψtz⟩ with the state of the query algorithm for f after t queries (with the query register
Dt duplicated). |Φt⟩ÃtDtEt|zxy depends on x and y only through z, which is fixed. Hence
I(X̃Ỹ : Et|Y )Φtz and I(X̃Ỹ : Et|XÃt)Φtz are both 0. Clearly, Φ
t
z is the state the protocol
would have been in if Π̂i were run with 0 error. Since the protocol runs of Π̂i make very
small error instead, we have instead ∥|Ψt⟩z − |Φt⟩z∥1 ≤ ϵ, where ϵ = O(δ/ poly(T ) log n).
This implies
I(X̃Ỹ : Et|Y )Ψtz = H(Et|Y )Ψtz − H(Et|X̃Ỹ Y )Ψtz
≤ H(Et|Y )Φtz − H(Et|X̃Ỹ Y )Φtz + 8ϵ log |Et| + 4h(ϵ)
= 8ϵ + 4h(ϵ).
The total sum of I(X̃Ỹ : Et|Y Bt,0)Ψtz over all t is therefore at most δ/2, and the same applies
to I(X̃Ỹ : Et|XÃt)Ψtz .
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We then have
































Pr[Dt = i] QIC(Π̂i, µiz)
≤ δ + T max
i
QIC(Π̂i, µiz)
≤ δ + O(T (log T + log log n + log 1/δ) max
i
QIC(Πi, µiz)).
Setting δ = T maxi QIC(Πi, µiz), but ensuring ϵ ≤ 1/3 (since we can’t amplify a negative
amount), we get











▶ Lemma 24. Let G be a gadget, let µ0 and µ1 be a 0-distribution and a 1-distribution for G,
let n ∈ N+, and let Π be a protocol computing ORn ◦ G (to bounded error against worst-case











Proof. Consider the following task: the goal is to output a hidden string z ∈ {0, 1}n, and
the allowed queries are subset-OR queries, meaning that for each subset S ⊆ [n] there is
a query which returns OR(zS) (which equals 1 if zi = 1 for some i ∈ S, and returns 0
otherwise). We can model this task as a query function F on a promise set P ⊆ {0, 1}2n .
Each string in P is a long encoding u(z) ∈ {0, 1}2n of some string z ∈ {0, 1}n, with the long
encoding u(z) being a string with (u(z))S = OR(zS) for all S. In other words, u is a function
u : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}2n . The function F is defined by F (u(z)) = z for all z ∈ {0, 1}n, where
Dom(F ) = {u(z) : z ∈ {0, 1}n}. It is not hard to verify that this function is well-defined.
The function f is sometimes called the combinatorial group testing problem. We have
D(F ) ≤ n, since we can query u(z){i} for all i ∈ [n] to get the bits zi one by one and then
output all of z. (Note that the input size to F is of length N = 2n, so n does not represent
the input size here.) Belovs [10] showed that Q(F ) = O(
√
n). This result will play a key role
in our analysis here, which is motivated by [11] (where this algorithm of Belovs was similarly
used to reduce direct-sum computations to OR computations).
Now, observe that F ◦ u is the identity function on n bit strings. The protocol Π′ for
G⊕ will be a protocol for F ◦ u ◦ G. We use Lemma 23 on the query function F and the
communication tasks u(G⊕n)1, u(G⊕n)2, . . . , u(G⊕n)2n . The query algorithm for F makes
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T = O(
√
n) queries. Each of the communication tasks is of the following form: take as input
n copies to G, and output the OR of a fixed subset S of the copies of G. To solve this task,
which we denote FS , we describe a protocol ΠS . In this protocol, Alice and Bob will use
their shared randomness to replace the inputs in positions i /∈ S by independent samples
from µ0. They will then run Π to compute the OR of the n copies of G.
The correctness of Π′ is clear, so we analyze its information cost. Fix z ∈ {0, 1}n, and
denote by zS the string satisfying (zS)i = zi if i ∈ S and (zS)i = 0 if i ∈ S. In order to
upper bound QIC(Π′, µz) using Lemma 23, we let µ′z be the distribution on strings of length
{0, 1}n2n that we get by sampling a string from µz and making 2n copies of it. We observe
that that the behavior of Π′ when acting on µz is exactly the composed behavior of the query
algorithm for F composed with the protocols ΠS acting on the distribution µ′z; Lemma 23
therefore gives us








maxS QIC(ΠS , µz)
))
(where we used the more precise bound given in the proof of Lemma 23). Recall that ΠS
replaces the samples of µz that correspond to bits i /∈ S with freshly-generated samples from
µ0, and then runs Π; hence QIC(ΠS , µz) = QIC(ΠS , µzS ) ≤ QIC(Π, µzS ). The maximum
over sets S of QIC(Π, µzS ) is clearly at most the maximum over w ∈ {0, 1}n of QIC(Π, µw).
Using log N = n, we can therefore write











▶ Lemma 25. Let G be a gadget, let µ0 and µ1 be a 0-distribution and a 1-distribution for G,
and let Π be a protocol computing G (to bounded error against worst-case inputs). Then for




QIC (Π′, µz) = O(n QIC(Π, µ0) + log n · QIC(Π, µ1)).
Proof. In order to compute ORn ◦ G, the protocol Π′ will simply compute each copy of G
one at a time, stopping as soon as a 1 has been found. The idea is that this will ensure the
number of computations of 0-inputs to G is at most O(n) while the number of computations
of 1-inputs to G is Õ(1).
To be more formal, we consider a cleaned up version Π̂ of Π, which will have error O(1/n)
and which cleans up all the garbage and resets Alice and Bob’s states to their initial states
after the computation is complete. The protocol Π′ will run Π̂ on each input to G, in
sequence, stopping when an output 1 has been found. To implement this, we will name the
registers: suppose the protocol Π̂ uses registers A and OA on Alice’s side and registers B
and OB on Bob’s side, where OA and OB store the final output of Π̂. At the beginning of Π̂,
the registers are expected to be |0⟩A |0⟩B |0⟩OA |0⟩OB . The guarantee of Π̂ is that at the end
of the algorithm, the registers will be in the state |0⟩A |0⟩B |b⟩OA |b⟩OB , where b is close to
the output of G on that input. We now implement Π′ by adding an additional register on
each side, denoted SA and SB , which stores the strings of outputs of all the runs of Π̂. These
registers are each initialized to 0n. At the end of run i of Π̂ (which computes gadget i), Alice
and Bob will each swap the register OA with the i-th bit of SA; this resets the registers used
by Π̂ to be all zero, and it stores the output of the i-th run of Π̂ so that Π′ has access to it.
It also preserves the property that SA = SB throughout the algorithm.
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The final detail is that in Π′, Alice and Bob only run Π̂ on gadget i if they see that all
the previous runs resulted in output 0; that is, they control the implementation of Π̂ on the
registers SA and SB being equal to 0n. This will ensure that once a 1 is found, no further
information will be exchanged between Alice and Bob. The final output of Π′ will be 0 if SA
and SB are 0n, and it will be 1 otherwise.
The correctness of Π′ (to worst-case bounded error) is clear, so we analyze its information
cost against µz for a fixed string z ∈ {0, 1}n. The information cost QIC(Π′, µz) is a sum
of information exchanged over all rounds; let QICi(Π′, µz) denote the sum of information
exchanged only in the rounds corresponding to the computation of the i-th copy of G, so
that QIC(Π′, µz) =
∑n
i=1 QICi(Π′, µz).
Let T be the number of rounds used by Π̂. Let SA,i and SB,i be the registers SA and SB
during the computation of the i-th copy of G. Use X and Y to denote Alice and Bob’s inputs
respectively, with Xi and Yi being the inputs to copy i of G and with X̃ and Ỹ denoting









We note that the register SB,i in the odd terms is classical, as is the register SA,i. Hence
the conditional mutual information conditioned on SB,i is the expectation of the conditional
mutual information conditioned on the events SB,i = w for each string w ∈ {0, 1}n (see, for
example, [12], end of Section 3.1). In other words,
I(X̃Ỹ : Ct|Y BtSB,i)
= Pr[SB,i = 0n]I(X̃Ỹ : Ct|Y Bt)SB,i=0n + Pr[SB,i ̸= 0n]I(X̃Ỹ : Ct|Y Bt)SB,i ̸=0n .
Note that by the construction of Π′, in the second term we have I(X̃Ỹ : Ct|Y Bt)SB,i≠=0n = 0,
since the registers Ct are all 0 as Alice and Bob do not run Π̂ at all when SB,i ̸= 0n. The
term I(X̃Ỹ : Ct|Y Bt)SB,i=0n is just I(X̃iỸi : Ct|YiBt), since the run of Π̂ ignores everything
outside of the input to the i-th copy of G. Hence we have
QICi(Π′, µz)
= Pr[SB,i = 0n]
∑
t≤T odd




= Pr[SA,i = 0] QIC(Π̂, µzi).




Pr[SA,i = 0n] QIC(Π̂, µzi).
To upper bound this, we note that the total sum of all the terms Pr[SA,i = 0n] QIC(Π̂, µzi)
for i such that zi = 0 is at most n QIC(Π̂, µ0), where we’ve upper bounded Pr[SA,i = 0n] ≤ 1.
For i such that zi = 1, we split into two cases: in the case where i is the first index such that
zi = 1, we upper bound Pr[SA,i = 0n] QIC(Π̂, µzi) ≤ QIC(Π̂, µ1). In contrast, for all i such
that zi = 1 and for which there was a previous index j < i with zj = 1, we note that the 1/n
error guarantee of Π̂ ensures that Pr[SA,i = 0n] ≤ 1/n; hence these terms are individually at
most (1/n) QIC(Π̂, µ1), and the sum of all of them is at most QIC(Π̂, µ1). We conclude that
QIC(Π′, µz) ≤ n QIC(Π̂, µ0) + 2 QIC(Π̂, µ1).
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Finally, we note that Π̂ simply repeats Π O(log n) times and takes a majority votes in order
to amplify (and then runs this in reverse to clean up garbage). Hence we have
QIC(Π̂, µ0) = O(log n · QIC(Π, µ0)),
QIC(Π̂, µ1) = O(log n · QIC(Π, µ1)).
This gives the upper bound on QIC(Π′, µz) of O(n log n · QIC(Π, µ0) + log n · QIC(Π, µ1)).
Finally, we sketch how to shave the log factor from the QIC(Π, µ0) term. To do so, we
avoid amplifying Π̂. Instead, we simply run Π̂ on each input. If the output is 1, we run
Π̂ again on the same copy of G. We do so until the number of 0 outputs outnumbers the
number of 1 outputs. If O(log n) repetitions happened and the number of 1-outputs is still
larger than the number of 0 inputs, we finally “believe” that this gadget evaluates to 1 and
halt. Otherwise, if the 0s outnumber the 1s before that point, then we assume the gadget
evaluated to 0 and move on to the next one.
By analyzing this as the “monkey on a cliff” problem, it is not hard to see that a 1
gadget is correctly labelled as such with constant probability. The total number of runs of Π̂
on 0-inputs will, on expectation, be at most O(n), while the total number of runs of Π̂ on
1-inputs will be at most O(log n) on expectation; since we avoided the O(log n) loss from
amplification, this protocol is more efficient, and we shave a log factor from the QIC(Π, µ0)
dependence.8 ◀
We are now ready to prove Theorem 21.
Proof. (of Theorem 21.) Using Lemma 25, we get a protocol Π2 computing ORn ◦ G
such that for any z ∈ {0, 1}n, QIC(Π2, µz) = O(n QIC(Π, µ0) + log n · QIC(Π, µ1)). Using




(n3/2 · QIC(Π, µ0) +
√





n QIC(Π, µ0) + log n · QIC(Π, µ1)
))
.
Finally, using Lemma 22, we get a protocol Π4 computing G such that
QIC(Π4, µ0) + QIC(Π4, µ1)
= O
((√










n QIC(Π, µ0) + log n · QIC(Π, µ1)
))
.
Moreover, by negating the output of G, such a protocol Π4 also exists with the µ0 and µ1
reversed.
Now, assume without loss of generality that QIC(Π, µ0) ≤ QIC(Π, µ1). Let ℓ be the
ratio QIC(Π, µ1)/ QIC(Π, µ0) ≥ 1 (here we use the assumption that QIC(Π, µ0) > 0 and
that QIC(Π, µ1) > 0). Let n ∈ N+ be ⌈2ℓ log 2ℓ⌉. Note that n is at most 3ℓ log 2ℓ, so
n = Θ(ℓ log 2ℓ) and log n = Θ(log 2ℓ). Using this value of n, we get Π′ such that
8 We thank Thomas Watson and Mika Göös for pointing out this “monkey on a cliff” strategy for
computing OR on a noisy oracle.
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QIC(Π′, µ0) + QIC(Π′, µ1)
= O
(√
QIC(Π, µ0) QIC(Π, µ1) log1/2
QIC(Π, µ0) + QIC(Π, µ1)√
QIC(Π, µ0), QIC(Π, µ1)




α = (QIC(Π, µ0) + QIC(Π, µ1))
11
QIC(Π, µ0)6 QIC(Π, µ1)6
.
If µ0 and µ1 are nontrivial, so that we have (say) QIC(Π, µ0) > 1/r10 and QIC(Π, µ1) >
1/r10, this can be simplified to
QIC(Π′, µ0) + QIC(Π, µ1) = O(
√
QIC(Π, µ0) QIC(Π, µ1) log3/2 r).
Finally, since n is at most polynomial in r, it is not hard to check that each of these reductions
increases the number of rounds by only a polynomial factor in r, so the final protocol Π′ has
number of rounds poly(r). ◀
5.3 Proving the lifting theorem
▶ Theorem 17. Let f : {0, 1}n → Σ be a relation (where n ∈ N+ and Σ is a finite alphabet)
and let G : X × Y → {0, 1} be a communication function which contains both AND2 and
OR2 as subfunctions. Then
QCC(f ◦ G) = Ω̃(Adv1(f) QICZ(G)).
Proof. Let µ′0 and µ′1 be the distributions for G provided by Theorem 19. Let µ0 be the
equal mixture of µ′0 and the uniform distribution over 0-inputs to the AND2 gadget inside of
G, and let µ1 be the equal mixture of µ′1 and the uniform distribution over the 1-inputs to the
OR2 gadget inside of G. We note that for any protocol Π, QIC(Π, µ0) ≥ QIC(Π, µ′0)/2 and
QIC(Π, µ1) ≥ QIC(Π, µ′1)/2. By [12], if Π has r rounds, QIC(Π, µ0), QIC(Π, µ1) = Ω(1/r).
So µ0 and µ1 are nontrivial for G.
Let Π be a protocol computing f ◦ G to error ϵ, and let r be the number of rounds used








where Ct is the message in the t-th round of Π and A′t, B′t are Alice and Bob’s memory
registers (which don’t necessarily have safe copies of their inputs). By the chain rule of
mutual information, we have
n∑
i=1
q′(z, i) = QIC(Π, µz) ≤ T
for all z ∈ {0, 1}n. A feasible weight scheme q(z, i) for Adv1(f) will be defined by normalizing
q′(z, i).
Let z, w ∈ {0, 1}n be such that f(z) and f(w) are disjoint, and such that their Hamming
distance is 1. Let i ∈ [n] be the bit on which they disagree, so that zi = w (where zi denotes
the string z with bit i flipped). Suppose without loss of generality that zi = 1 and wi = 0.
In order to lower bound q′(z, i) · q′(w, i), we will use the protocol Π for f ◦ G to construct a
protocol Π′ for G.
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The protocol Π′ is given by [41] (Lemma 4). Alice and Bob start with the shared entangled
state of Π, as well the X̃−iX−iỸ−iY−i registers of their inputs and purification according to
µz−i (=µw−i) in Π, with Alice holding A0X̃<iỸ<iX−i and Bob holding B0X̃>iỸ>iY−i (here
X−i denotes X1 . . . Xi−1Xi+1 . . . Xn and the same is true for other variables). They will
embed their inputs for Π′, which we call X ′, Y ′ (with purifications X̃ ′Ỹ ′), into the i-th input
register for Π (with X̃ ′, Ỹ ′ being embedded as X̃i, Ỹi), and use their shared entanglement for
the rest of the input registers, to run Π. After running Π, they will output 1 if Π outputs a
symbol in f(z) (outputting 0 otherwise). Note that since Π outputs a symbol in f(z) with
probability at least 1 − ϵ when given an input from (G⊕n)−1(z) and with probability at most
ϵ when given an input from (G⊕n)−1(w) (since f(w) ∩ f(z) = ∅), it follows that Π′ succeeds
to error ϵ on worst-case inputs to G.

















Similarly, QIC(Π′, µ1) = q(z, i), so we have√
q′(z, i)q′(w, i) =
√
QIC(Π′, µ0) QIC(Π′, µ1).
By Theorem 21, there is a protocol Π′′ such that√
q′(z, i)q′(w, i) = Ω
(




By the choice of µ0 and µ1, we therefore have√
q′(z, i)q′(w, i) = Ω(QICZ(G)/ polylog r),
and hence by taking q(z, i) = O(polylog r/ QICZ(G)) · q′(z, i), we get q(z, i)q(w, i) ≥ 1. If
we start with a protocol Π with number of rounds r at most QCCϵ(f ◦ G), we conclude
QCCϵ(f ◦ G) = Ω̃(Adv1(f) QICZ(G)),
as desired. ◀
6 New query relations
In this section, we prove our new relationships in query complexity. We start by showing
that cfbs(f) is equivalent to CAdv(f) for partial functions. To do so, we will first need the
well-known dual form for the fractional block sensitivity at a specific input, fbs(x, f). This
dual form can be derived by writing the weight scheme defining fbs(x, f) as a linear program,
and taking the dual; this gives a minimization program in which fbs(x, f) is the minimum,
over weight schemes q(i) ≥ 0 assigned to each i ∈ [n] that satisfy
∑
i∈B q(i) ≥ 1 for each
sensitive block B ⊆ [n] of x (with respect to f), of the sum
∑
i∈[n] q(i). See any of [2, 40, 28]
for a formal proof.
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▶ Lemma 26. cfbs(f) ≤ 2 CAdv(f).
Proof. Let q(x, i) be a feasible weight scheme for CAdv(f) with objective value equal to
CAdv(f). We construct a completion f ′ of f as follows. For each z /∈ Dom(f), let z′ ∈ Dom(f)





′, i). Set f ′(z) = f(z′). Now
let x be any input in Dom(f); we wish to upper bound fbs(x, f ′).
To this end, we pick weights q(i) = 2q(x, i), and claim that they are a feasible solution to
the fractional block sensitivity for f ′ at x. Let B be any sensitive block for x with respect
to f ′. Then xB is some input z which disagrees with x exactly on the bits in B, and which

































min{q(x, i), q(z′, i)} ≥ 1.




i∈[n] 2q(x, i) ≤
2 CAdv(f), and hence cfbs(f) ≤ 2 CAdv(f), as desired. ◀
▶ Lemma 27 (Krišjānis Prūsis, personal communication). CAdv(f) ≤ cfbs(f).
Proof. Let f ′ be a completion of f for which fbs(x, f ′) ≤ cfbs(f) for all x ∈ Dom(f). For
each x ∈ Dom(f), let qx(i) be a feasible weight scheme for the minimization problem of
fbs(x, f ′) which satisfies
∑
i∈[n] qx(i) ≤ fbs(x, f ′) ≤ cfbs(f) and for each sensitive block B of
f ′,
∑
i∈B qx(i) ≥ 1.
We construct a weight scheme for CAdv(f) by setting q(x, i) = qx(i) for all x ∈ Dom(f).
We claim this weight scheme is feasible. To see this, let x, y ∈ Dom(f) be such that
f(x) ̸= f(y). Define the input z ∈ {0, 1}n such that zi = xi if xi = yi, and otherwise, zi = xi
if q(x, i) ≥ q(y, i) and zi = yi if q(y, i) > q(x, i). Suppose that f ′(z) ̸= f(x). Then∑
i:xi ̸=yi
min{q(x, i), q(y, i)} =
∑
i:xi ̸=zi
min{q(x, i), q(y, i)} +
∑
i:yi ̸=zi







q(y, i) ≥ 1. ◀






(1 − 2ϵ) fbs(f).
Proof. Let x ∈ Dom(f) be such that fbs(x, f) = fbs(f). By negating the input bits of f if
necessary, we may assume that x = 0n (note that negating input bits does not affect fbs(f)
or d̃eg(f)). By negating the output of f if necessary, we can further assume that f(0n) = 0.
Let p be a polynomial of degree d̃egϵ(f) which approximates f to error ϵ.
Let PrORk be the promise problem on k bits whose domain contains all the strings of
Hamming weights 0 or 1, and which outputs 0 given 0k and outputs 1 given an input of
Hamming weight 1.
A. Anshu, S. Ben-David, and S. Kundu 30:35
We give an exact polynomial representation of this function. To do so, let Td be the
Chebyshev polynomial of degree d; this is the single-variate real polynomial satisfying
Td(cos θ) = cos(dθ). This polynomial is bounded in [−1, 1] on the interval [−1, 1]. Moreover,
it satisfies Td(1) = 1 and Td(cos(π/d)) = −1. Hence the polynomial r(t) = (1 − Td(1 − (1 −
cos(π/d))t))/2 evaluates to 0 at t = 0 and to 1 at t = 1. Moreover, since this Td is bounded
in [−1, 1] on the interval [−1, 1], we conclude that r(t) is bounded in [0, 1] on the interval
[0, 2/(1 − cos(π/d))]. Since cos(z) ≥ 1 − z2/2, we have 2/(1 − cos(π/d)) ≥ 4d2/π2. Hence
r(t) is bounded in [0, 1] on the interval [0, 4d2/π2]. If we pick d such that 4d2/π2 ≥ k, that
is, d at least ⌈π
√
k/2⌉, then we would know that r(t) is bounded on [0, k]. In that case, the
k-variate polynomial q(x) = r(x1 + x2 + · · · + xk) would exactly compute PrORk, and it





Next, consider the function f ◦ PrORk. We can approximate this function to error ϵ
simply by plugging in n independent copies of the polynomial q into the variables of the




On the other hand, we now claim that for appropriate choice of k, we have bs(0kn, f ◦
PrORk) ≥ k fbs(0n, f), and hence bs(f ◦ PrORk) ≥ k fbs(f). To see this, let {wB}B be an
optimal weight scheme for the fractional block sensitivity of 0n with respect to f , so that∑
B:i∈B wB ≤ 1 and
∑
B wB = fbs(f). Note that since fractional block sensitivity is a linear
program, the optimal solution can be taken to be rational; let L be a common denominator
of all the weights, so that LwB is an integer for each sensitive block B. Now take k to be
an integer multiple of L. For each sensitive block B of 0n with respect to f , we define kwB
different sensitive blocks of 0kn with respect to f ◦ PrORk, such that all of the new blocks
are mutually disjoint. To do so, we simply use a different bit in each copy of PrORk for
each block. Since the sum of weights wB for blocks that use bit i of the input to f is at most
1, the total number of new blocks we will generate that use copy i of PrORk is at most k,
and hence we can give each block a different bit of that copy of PrORk. The total number
of disjoint blocks will then be k
∑
B wB = k fbs(f).
We conclude that bs(f ◦ PrORk) ≥ k fbs(f) as long as k is a multiple of a certain integer
L. Now, by a standard result [9, 15], we know that the approximate degree to error ϵ of a
(possibly partial) Boolean function is at least the square root of its block sensitivity; more
explicitly, we have
d̃egϵ(f ◦ PrORk) ≥
√
1 − 2ϵ
2(1 − ϵ) bs(f ◦ PrORk) ≥
√
1 − 2ϵ
2(1 − ϵ)k fbs(f).
Combined with our upper bound on this degree, we have
d̃egϵ(f) · (π
√
k/2 + 1) ≥
√
1 − 2ϵ
2(1 − ϵ)k fbs(f),







1 − ϵ fbs(f),
from which the desired result follows. ◀
▶ Theorem 29. For all (possibly partial) Boolean functions f , we have
d̃egϵ(f) ≥
√
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Proof. Let p be a polynomial which approximates f to error ϵ. Then p(x) ∈ [0, 1] for all
x ∈ {0, 1}n, so define f ′(x) by f ′(x) = 1 if p(x) ≥ 1/2 and f ′(x) = 0 if p(x) < 1/2. It is
clear that f ′(x) = f(x) for all x ∈ Dom(f), so f ′ is a completion of f . Let x ∈ Dom(f) be
an input so that fbs(x, f ′) ≥ cfbs(f). To complete the proof, it will suffice to lower bound
the degree of p by Ω(
√
fbs(x, f ′)).
Suppose without loss of generality that f(x) = 0 (otherwise, negate f and f ′ and
replace p with 1 − p). Then we know that p(x) ∈ [0, ϵ], and that for any y ∈ {0, 1}n
such that f ′(x) ̸= f ′(y), we have p(y) ∈ [1/2, 1]. This means that the polynomial q(z) =
(2p(z) + 1 − 2ϵ)/(3 − 2ϵ) has the same degree as p, is bounded in [0, 1] on {0, 1}n, and
approximates f ′ to error 1/(3 − 2ϵ) on the input x and on all inputs y ∈ {0, 1}n such that
f ′(x) ̸= f ′(y). In other words, consider the partial function f ′x which is the restriction of
f ′ to the promise set {x} ∪ {y ∈ {0, 1}n : f ′(y) ̸= f ′(x)}. Then q approximates f ′x to error
1/(3 − 2ϵ), and has the same degree as p. Now, it is not hard to see that fbs(f ′x) = fbs(x, f ′).
Hence it suffices to lower bound the degree of q by Ω(
√
fbs(f ′x)). Such a lower bound follows





1 − ϵ cfbs(f). ◀
▶ Theorem 30. For all (possibly partial) Boolean functions f ,
CAdv(f) ≤ 2 Adv(f)2.
Proof. Let f be a (possibly partial) Boolean function, and q(x, i) be a feasible weight scheme
for Adv(f) that has
∑
i∈[n] q(x, i) ≤ Adv(f) for all i. Fix any x, y ∈ Dom(f) such that













min{q(x, i), q(y, i)} ·
∑
i:xi ̸=yi
max{q(x, i), q(y, i)}.
Note that max{q(x, i), q(y, i)} ≤ q(x, i) + q(y, i), and we know the sum over i of q(x, i) and
q(y, i) are each at most Adv(f). Hence we get∑
i:xi ̸=yi
max{q(x, i), q(y, i)} ≤ 2 Adv(f),
and hence∑
i:xi ̸=yi
min{q(x, i), q(y, i)} ≥ 12 Adv(f) .
This means that if we scale the weights q(x, i) up by a uniform factor of 2 Adv(f), the
resulting weight scheme q′(x, i) will be feasible for CAdv(f). The objective value of this new
weight scheme will then be the maximum over x of∑
i∈[n]
q′(x, i) = 2 Adv(f)
∑
i∈[n]
q(x, i) ≤ 2 Adv(f)2,
so CAdv(f) ≤ 2 Adv(f)2, as desired. ◀
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